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Order of Precedence: How UKIP Built Its 2014 European Lists Before a Single Vote Was Cast

UKIP MEPs Archive
Order of Precedence: How UKIP Built Its 2014 European Lists Before a Single Vote Was Cast

Photo: Alfredovic, CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

The 2014 European Parliament elections are remembered at UKIP MEPs Archive chiefly for their outcome: twenty-four seats, the largest national share of the vote, and a party that had spent two decades describing the European Parliament as a legislature nobody had asked for suddenly occupying a substantial corner of it. The campaign itself has been well trawled. What receives less attention is the machinery that produced the names printed on the ballot paper in the first place — a selection process completed, in its essentials, months before polling day and largely out of public view.

For a party whose central argument was that Brussels legislated without a proper mandate, UKIP's own route into the chamber ran through an unusually centralised procedure. The lists were not assembled by open primaries, nor by postal ballots of the whole membership in each region. They were drawn up region by region, vetted by a central committee, and approved at the top of the party. That is not a scandal; it is a design choice, and one that goes a long way towards explaining the character of the cohort that arrived in Strasbourg and Brussels in July 2014.

Twelve regions, fourteen lists, one committee

The United Kingdom's European elections were fought in twelve regional constituencies in England, plus Scotland and Wales. UKIP, which did not contest Northern Ireland, therefore needed fourteen ranked lists. Each list was a self-contained slate: voters chose a party, and the party's internal ordering decided which of its candidates took the seats the count allotted.

Applicants were interviewed rather than simply nominated. Contemporary accounts describe a candidates committee working through the autumn of 2013 and into the following spring, assessing experience, media handling and past associations, with the party's National Executive Committee holding the final say on approval. Prospective candidates were asked about previous party membership, about public statements, and about the kind of material that would later become a standing hazard of British political life: material posted online.

The vetting was not decorative. A number of applicants were reportedly removed or refused on the basis of past membership of far-right organisations, a sensitivity the party had carried since the late 2000s. Others fell away over remarks made at meetings or in writing. The archive record of the period is patchy and much of it rests on briefing and counter-briefing, but the broad shape is not in serious dispute: a gatekeeping process existed, it was operated centrally, and it was applied unevenly enough to generate complaint from within the party's own regional structures.

The arithmetic of position one

The decisive act in any list system is not the interview but the ranking. In regions where UKIP expected to poll strongly — the South East, the East, the South West, the North West, the West Midlands — the first two or three places were effectively seats in waiting. Being placed fourth rather than third, or third rather than second, was the difference between a parliamentary career and a footnote.

That arithmetic was settled by the party, not by the membership. The most conspicuous illustration is the South East, where the then party leader took the top slot in a region the party expected to win multiple seats; but the pattern ran through every list. Sitting MEPs were generally protected at the top. Candidates with long service to the party were placed in electable positions as a form of internal reward. Newcomers with professional profiles but shallow party histories were slotted lower, or placed in regions where the party's prospects were thinner.

Critics inside the party at the time argued that this produced a cohort chosen for loyalty and public recognition rather than for any particular aptitude for legislative work. Defenders replied that a national campaign required a national hand on the名单 — that regional autonomy had produced uneven quality in earlier cycles, and that a party seeking to present itself as a government-in-waiting could not leave its most consequential slate of candidates to chance or to local faction.

Rows, removals and the awkward paperwork

No selection process of this scale runs cleanly, and UKIP's was no exception. There were disputes over the removal of candidates who had already been publicly announced; complaints from regional organisers that London had overridden local preferences; and at least one round of unwelcome press attention when past remarks by selected candidates surfaced after approval rather than before it. The party's response — usually a rapid withdrawal or a statement of disassociation — became a recurring motif of the early months of 2014.

There was also the quieter friction of the paper exercise itself. Candidates were required to declare, complete and return documentation within tight deadlines set by returning officers, and the party's small central staff were handling fourteen lists simultaneously. Errors at this stage are rarely politically dramatic, but they are unforgiving: a nomination paper rejected on a technicality removes a name from the ballot entirely.

What the lists produced

The consequence of all this is visible in the record. The 2014 intake was, by the standards of European Parliament cohorts, unusually cohesive and unusually leadership-friendly. Its members had, in the main, come through a central filter; many had stood for the party repeatedly before being placed in a winnable position; and almost none had an independent base within the party that could rival the leadership's. Rebellion rates in the 2014–2020 Parliament reflected that inheritance.

It is a mild irony worth recording in this archive. A party that campaigned against decision-making removed from the voter ended up choosing its European candidates through a process that was, in its essentials, a committee of the centre. The 2014 result was decided at the count — but the shape of the twenty-four was decided long before, in a room, by a handful of people, ordering names on a piece of paper.

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